





‘Context of Commonality’ or Why Sharing 
Is More than Attending*
Abstract
This paper attempts to suggest that subjectivity should be viewed as extroverted and world-
oriented rather than exclusively as introverted. It further suggests that subjectivities con-
gregate in social surroundings, and that this type of experience is primary. If this is true, 
the question arises as to whether we cannot conceive of intersubjectivity as a method of 
possibly bypassing the gap that, according to skeptics, the problem of other minds has cre-
ated. The paper then discusses the concept of the plurality of the self as a counterpoint to 
individualist and isolationist assessments of the mind that regard it inaccessible; however, 
this paper also states that not every joint attending is proper sharing. With more complex 
objects of attention, such as cultural artifacts, a version of mutual knowledge (for which the 
term ‘context of commonality’ has been coined) is necessary on the part of co-attenders and 
co-agents for this interaction to be considered shared experience.
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ment.	 It	 lifts	 the	single	organism	out	of	 the	singularity	of	 its	







The myth of encapsulated mind and introvert subjectivity
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Namely,	I	believe	that	 the	“first-personness”	that	 is	believed	to	capture	 the	
uniqueness	of	subjective	experience	is	not	only	limited	to	exclusively	singular	













of	data	what	 is	 reality	 for	 the	organism.	So	 instead	of	“reporting”	on	 the	 in-
nermost	states,	they	help	us	recognize	what	counts	as	relevant	for	the	organism	












that	my subjectivity is not destined to isolationism but, rather, lives a dynamic 



































1. Bypassing the problem of other 
  minds in interpersonal way?
The	idea	that	mind	is	not	locked	in	isolation,	that	subjectivity	does	not	ex-
ist	as	an	exclusively	inner	state	nor	is	irreducibly	imprisoned	“within,”	has	















lead	 to	 a	 theoretical	 image	of	mind	as	 isolated	 in	 subjectivity,	whose	only	
plausible	version	 is	 a	 solipsist	privacy	of	which	one	can	only	grasp	 if	one	
knows	what	it	is	like	to	be	in	that	state	(comp.	Nagel,	1974).




why	 the	 idea	 of	 mind-within-the-head	 has	
been	 taken	 seriously	 in	 philosophy	 at	 all,	
even	by	those	who	are	critical	of	it	and	want	
to	 overcome	 it,	 e.g.	 by	 “extending”	 it.	 The	
very	 idea	of	 the	extended	mind	actually	 im-
plies	that	there	is	something	like	core	(within-
the-head)	mind,	which	means	 that	mind	can	
also	 function	 in	 an	 unextended	 way.	 But	 I	
think	it	is	wrong	to	claim	anything	like	that.	
All	 mentality	 is,	 by	 virtue	 of	 intentionality,	









–	The	hard problem of consciousness	(Chalmers,	1995;	Harnad,	1995;	Shear,	
1996,	1997)	was	designed	to	make	us	aware	that	phenomenal	experience	has	














witnessing	 of	 how	 something	 feels	 to	 the	 feeler.	 Because	 the	 third-person	












































Although	 in	 these	quotes	 the	 term	 ‘directness’	may	 appear	 straightforward	
and	 unambiguous,	 it	 is	 far	 from	 self-understood	 (see	 e.g.	 Radman,	 2012),	






































































know	better	about	other	minds	 than	 theorists	do	and	are	able	 to	eventually	
decipher	the	riddle	of	the	POM,	which	theorists	merely	posit?	This	question	








(at	 least	 not	 in	 the	 form)	 that	 the	 latter	 sees	 as	 crucial.	What	 is	 important	
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mind’s	pragmatic	presence	in	the	world	should	be	viewed	as	natural	mode	of	






















The	 idea	 of	 fundamentality	 of	 social	 interrelatedness	 can	 also	 be	 found	 in	
quite	 a	 different	 theoretical	 source:	 Jean-Luc	Nancy’s	Being Singular Plu-
ral	(2000).	The	author	provides	a	brief	reminder	on	Rousseau’s,	Nietzsche’s,	
Marx’s,	and	Heidegger’s	 ideas	on	societal	 relations	of	 individuals	but	con-
cludes	that	“No	one,	however,	has	radically	thematized	the	‘with’	as	the	es-
sential	trait	of	Beings	as	its	proper	plural	singular	coessence”	(Nancy	2000,	
34).	It	is	also	thinking	that	begins	“from	the	‘with’	as	the	proper essence of 















His	 comprised	 formulation	 reads:	 “[…]	 a	 singularity	 is	 indissociable	 from	
a	plurality”	(ibid.,	32).	And	also:	“Community	is	bare,	but	it	is	imperative”	
(ibid.,	36).	If	one	would	dare	to	freely	rephrase	Nancy’s	saying	in	phenomeno-
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The	view,	however,	clashes	with	the	dominant	stand	according	to	which	we	
seek	mind’s	origin	and	nature	by	 looking	 in	 the	opposite	direction,	 toward	
the	 irreducibly	 individual	mental	constellations	 that	no	other	mind	(neither	
ordinary	nor	scientific)	can	access	or	capture.	This	traditionalist	account,	as	














they	all	engage	 in	acting	 that	 takes	place	 in	 the	space	of	 interaction	where	


























































Because	we	 take	up	all	 these	 roles	naturally	 and	effortlessly,	we	never	 (or	










where	 essentialists’	 ambitions	 dissolve	 as	 the	 focus	 shifts	 toward	 interper-
sonal	behavior.
The	German	expressions	for	labeling	co-agental	unity	are,	for	instance:	Mit-
mensch, Mitbürger, Mitarbeiter, Mitbewohner, Mitspieler, Mitschüller, Mit-
fahrer, Mitstreiter,	etc.	People	who	act	within	a	given	situation	in	which	they	
are	driven	to	act	together	and	in	a	coordinated	way,	perform	actions	to	which	
expressions	can	be	applied,	such	as:	mitmachen, miterleben, mitbekommen, 














































ing	 bigger	 than	 life,	 thanks	 to	 participation	 in	 collective	 rituals”	 (McNeil,	
1995,	2;	emphases	added).
Symbolic	practices	are	the	kind	of	“collective	rituals”	that	create	more	com-





3. Context of commonality
The	aspect	of	going	“beyond	itself”	in	“collective	rituals”	(which	creates	the	
network	of	social	exchange	in	which	individuality	is	enhanced	to	encompass	























disappointment;	but	 there	 is	 also	humor	and	 laughter.	However,	 for	an	ex-
ternal	observer,	 say	a	 stranger	not	 acquainted	with	 the	 family	and	 its	past,	
we	can	hardly	expect	 that	any	similar	 reactions	will	occur.	He	or	 she	may	
indeed	be	attentive	and	even	try	to	show	interest	but,	obviously,	those	who	
are	 unfamiliar	with	 the	 context	 cannot	 participate	 the	 same	way	 as	 others	
who	know	the	circumstances	well.	Decisive	 in	 this	process	 is	not	attention	
























































































church	–	dictates	a	specific	code	of	behavior	 to	which	all	 those	entering	 it	
normally	abide.	In	spite	of	declared	tolerance,	there	exists	a	sort	of	cohesion	
among	 those	who	share	 the	premises	provided	by	 the	religious	CC,	 just	as	
there	is	(another)	one	that	connects	non-believers.






















































































communal	 significations,	 nothing	within	 that	 space	 remains	 innocent.	Ob-
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or	 act	 upon.	Turning	 our	 theoretical	 gaze	 toward	more	 complex	 (cultural)	
objects	of	interpersonal	exchange	makes	us	aware	that	there	is	so	much	more	
to	be	done	in	this	domain.
Conclusions and further considerations
As	mentioned	previously,	whenever	bodies	meet	it	is	not	a	guarantee	that	a	









equipped	 with	 subjective	 attitudes,	 with	 associations,	 sentiments,	 reminis-
cences,	expectations,	guesses,	goals,	imagination,	etc.
In	 order	 for	 “togetherness”	 to	 take	 place,	 co-attenders	 and	 co-agents	must	
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Ovaj rad nastoji ustvrditi da se subjektivnost treba promatrati kao ekstrovertiranu i orijentiranu 
prema svijetu prije nego izričito introvertiranu. Nadalje se tvrdi da se subjektiviteti okupljaju u 
društvenim okruženjima, i da je takav tip iskustva primaran. Ako je to točno, otvara se pitanje 
nemogućnosti poimanja intersubjektivnosti kao metode mogućeg zaobilaženja jaza stvorenog, 
prema skepticima, problemom drugih umova. U radu se nadalje raspravlja o pojmu pluralnosti 
sebstva kao protuteže individualističkim i izolacionističkim razmatranjima uma koji ih smatraju 
nepristupačnima; no, također se tvrdi da nije svaka zajednička pažnja pravo uzajamno iskustvo. 
Kod komplesnijih objekata pažnje, poput kulturnih artefakata, verzija zajedničkog znanja (za 
koju je skovan termin ‘kontekst zajedničkog’) nužna je kod su-pazitelja i su-subjekata kako bi 
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Zdravko Radman
‚Kontext der Gemeinsamkeit‘ oder warum Teilen mehr als Aufmerksamkeit ist
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Paper versucht zu suggerieren, die Subjektivität sollte als extrovertiert und weltorien-
tiert, und nicht ausschließlich als introvertiert angesehen werden. Es lässt weiterhin darauf 
schließen, dass sich die Subjektivitäten im sozialen Umfeld versammeln und diese Art von Er-
fahrung primär ist. Wenn dies wahr ist, ergibt sich die Frage, ob wir außerstande sind, uns 
die Intersubjektivität als eine Methode zur möglichen Überbrückung der Kluft vorzustellen, 
die, laut Skeptikern, vom Problem anderer Verstande geschaffen wurde. Ferner diskutiert der 
Artikel den Begriff der Pluralität des Selbst als Kontrapunkt zu individualistischen und iso-
lationistischen Einschätzungen des Verstands, die ihn für unzugänglich halten; diese Arbeit 
legt jedoch auch dar, dass nicht jede gemeinsame Aufmerksamkeit ein richtiges Teilen ist. Bei 
komplexeren Objekten der Aufmerksamkeit, wie z. B. kulturellen Artefakten, ist eine Version des 
gemeinsamen Wissens (wofür der Terminus ‚Kontext der Gemeinsamkeit‘ geprägt wurde) von-
seiten der Aufmerksamkeitsteilnehmer und Mitagierenden notwendig, damit diese Interaktion 





Le ‘contexte de la communauté’ ou pourquoi le partage est plus que la présence
Résumé
Cet article essaie d’établir que la subjectivité devrait être considérée comme étant extravertie et 
orientée vers le monde plutôt qu’explicitement introvertie. On affirme ensuite que les subjecti-
vités s’assemblent dans des environnements sociaux et que ce type d’expérience est primordial. 
Si cela est vrai, se pose la question de l’impossibilité de concevoir l’intersubjectivité en tant 
que méthode d’un contournement possible de l’écart qui est créé, selon les sceptiques, par le 
problème des autres esprits. L’article examine ensuite le concept de pluralité de soi comme 
contrepoint des appréciations de l’esprit individualistes et isolationnistes qui les considèrent 
comme étant inaccessibles ; cependant, on affirme également que chaque attention conjointe 
n’est pas un véritable partage. Chez des objets d’attention plus complexes, tels que des arte-
facts culturels, la version de la connaissance commune (pour laquelle le terme ‘contexte de la 
communauté’ a été inventé) est nécessaire chez les co-participants et les co-sujets pour que cette 
interaction puisse être considérée comme une expérience partagée.
Mots-clés
problème	des	autres	esprits,	nous-ité,	partage,	attention	conjointe,	action	conjointe,	‘contexte	de	la	
communauté’,	culture
